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ABSTRACT
ANALYZING THE REDESIGN OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY THROUGHOUT HISTORY
(Under the direction ofProfessor Timothy Nordstrom)
The United States intelligence community is an integral part ofthe security of our'
nation. It has been continually growing and redesigning itself for the past 230 years to
suit the needs ofthe people and ofthe nation. Inhibiting the American intelligence
system, however, is the struggle for the U.S. to find a balance between the rights ofthe
people and the security ofthe nation. This struggle has been at the basis ofchange in
almost every instance ofintelligence redesign. It is these changes that have become the
study of this thesis.
Major trends found in the redesign ofthe U.S. intelligence system can be
categorized in three ways. First, early American intelligence history shows the common
mindset that intelligence was needed only in times of war. Were intelligence used in
peace time, it would be a breach ofthe people’s rights to privacy as well as a breach of
trust among nations. Second, as the nation evolved and became embroiled in more and
greater conflicts, the people realized that it was necessary to not only have intelligence
during wars, but also, in order for war time intelligence to be most effective, it had to
remain flmctioning during peace time. It was essential, however, that these new,full
time intelligence units severely limit their capabilities and functions during peace time.
Finally, it has only been in the last sixty years that intelligence units have existed and
functioned both during times of war and ofpeace.
Vitally important to the study ofthese changes in attitude towards intelligence are
the three common threads which are found throughout history. These threads which bind
the history ofintelligence redesign include: 1) Change to the intelligence community
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comes on the heels ofintelligence failures; 2)Intelligence failures occur because ofthe
lack of cohesion in the intelligence community; 3)The lack of cohesion stems from the
inherent American struggle to find a balance between rights and security.

VI

Table of Contents
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Vlll

INTRODUCTION

1'

CHAPTER I: WAR TIMEINTELUGENCE,

8

CHAPTER II: BEGINNINGS OFA PERMANENTINTELLIGENCE SYSTEM.

20

CHAPTER III: FOUNDING OF THEINTELUGENCE COMMUNITY

,43

CHAPTER IV: NEW WORLD OFINTELLIGENCE

55

CONCLUSION

58

BIBLIOGRAPHY

62

Vll

List of Abbreviations
AFSA

Armed Forces Security Agency

CD

Censorship and Documents Branch of DDI

CFI

Committee on Foreign Intelligence

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency

CIG

Central Intelligence Group

COI

Coordinator ofInformation

DCI

Director of Central Intelligence

DDI

Deputy Director of Intelligence

DDO

Deputy Director of Operations

DIA

Defense Intelligence Agency

DNI

Director of National Intelligence

DOD

Department of Defense

FBI

Federal Bureau ofInvestigation

FN

Foreign Nationalities Branch ofDDI

GHQ

General Headquarters

G-2

Army intelligence

HUMINT

Human Intelligence

IC

Intelligence community

IMINT

Imagery Intelligence

lOB

Intelligence Oversight Board

JCS

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Vlll

MAGIC

Decoded Japanese messages

MID

Military Intelligence Division

MI-8

Code and cipher section

NIA

National Intelligence Authority

NIEs

National Intelligence Estimates

NMI

National Military Establishment

NRO

National Reconnaissance Office

NSA

National Security Agency

NSC

National Security Council

OAG

Operations Advisory Group

ONI

Office of Naval Intelligence

OSS

Office of Strategic Services

SI

Secret Intelligence

SIGINT

Signals intelligence

SIS

Signals Intelligence Service

R&A

Research and Analysis

R&D

Research and Development

ULTRA

Decoded German messages

WMD

Weapons of Mass Destruction

X-2

Counterespionage Branch ofDDI

IX

Introduction
"Those who expect to reap the blessings offreedom, must, like men, undergo thefatigues.
ofsupporting it. ”-Thomas Paine, The American Crisis
On September 11,2001, the United States was rocked by the news that the World
Trade Center’s twin towers had crumbled to the ground after two hijacked commercial
airliners crashed into their upper floors. Additionally, another commercial airliner, also
hijacked, crashed into the Pentagon, and another into a field in Pennsylvania, diverted
from its original path to what may very well have been the White House or the Capitol.
After the initial shock oflosing over three thousand Americans at the hands of
international terrorists, America became enraged and demanded answers as to why this
massive atrocity had occurred. People equated the 9/11 disaster to the disaster at Pearl
Harbor at the hands ofthe Japanese in 1941, only this time the attackers were radical,
violent Islamic fimdamentalists. As questions concerning what could have been done to
prevent the disaster, many people began to see stark similarities to the shortcomings that
surrounded the Pearl Harbor attack. Why,they asked, in the intelligence age, was the
United States so completely surprised by the 9/11 attacks, and how can we change the
system so that no tragedy so great as these will ever occur on American soil again? What
we need, they said, is better security.
In the face ofthis disaster, the majority of Americans were solely focused on the
security ofthe nation rather than on personal rights, but patriotism and sentimentalism
waned in the following months. After the belated war on terror finally began and raged
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on in Afghanistan and into Iraq, people began to question the infringement oftheir ri^ts.
The war quickly became unpopular with the American public, yet it is only one part of
the newest American struggle to balance rights and security. Along with the heightened
security came greater levels ofscrutiny and prejudice backed by congressional
legislation. New laws such as the Patriot Act, which allowed greater freedom to the
intelligence community(IC)in an expanding technological age, and scandals involving
the NSA and the nation’s top leaders, caused Americans to step back and consider the
importance of their rights versus their security. The inherent struggle to find this balance
that has characterized the United States since the American Revolution reared its head
once again in the modem world, and, inevitably, new laws will be passed and changes to
the intelligence system will happen again.
While Pearl Harbor and 9/11 are only two events out of many that have
influenced the redesign ofthe U.S. intelligence system, they have been the major
catalysts for change. But there are infinitely many factors, both internationally and
domestically that affect change to and within the IC, not simply major attacks on
America. Analyzing the redesign ofthe U.S. intelligence community throughout history
will elucidate the factors that affect change and will illustrate why that change is
necessary. It is important to understand first, however, the idea ofintelligence and its
necessity to the survival ofour nation.
Mark M. Lowenthal, author ofIntelligence: From Secrets to Policy, said that
“Intelligence is not about tmth!” Ifintelligence is not about tmth,then what exactly is
intelligence supposed to be? Intelligence is a diverse idea with countless definitions that
often complement and contradict one another. Sometimes it is considered the finished
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analysis of gathered information, as a product to be consumed by policy makers. Other
times it is the process of collecting information and setting requirements, and still other
times it is simply the community that provides information. Intelligence is inherently
secretive. It is part ofthe way nations struggle for security, and it is vital to that cause. It
drives policy, and as Lowenthal says, it is not truth, but is instead a suggested reality.
Intelligence would not be needed if state secrets were open and known to be true. They
are not, however, and in order to draft good policy, foreign and domestic. United States
government leaders must be informed, whether it is truth or an approximation of that
truth. (13)
Intelligence is a continually moving cycle that first begins with a planning and
direction phase. During this stage ofthe process, policy makers work with members of
the Intelligence Community(IC)in order to set intelligence priorities that will, in theory,
eventually affect foreign policy. Information collection is the second phase ofthe
intelligence process, which then leads to processing and analysis and producing
conclusions on the collected information. The last phase ofthe intelligence process is
information dissemination back to the decision makers who helped set intelligence
gathering priorities in the first place. This disseminated information is then used to help
make informed policy decisions, and to set further intelligence priorities.(22)
There are many purposes for intelligence agencies that include avoiding strategic
surprise; providing long-term expertise; supporting the policy process; and maintaining
the secrecy ofinformation, needs, and methods. In order for the IC to endeavor in the
dark world of cloak and dagger and fulfill its purposes to the United States, special
consideration is taken in the areas ofleadership and policy for the maintenance of
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secrecy. One ofthe most important aspects ofintelligence agencies is the fact that thenleadership and employees generally make careers out oftheir service and are not elected
for short increments oftime as are the policy makers. Although it can be argued that
leaders in the IC sometimes insert their personal objectives at driving policy, it is
infinitely more important that they are not continually swayed in judgment by the nature
ofthe voting public. Therefore, they are better equipped to collect and analyze
information, and they are able to communicate security issues tailored to the needs ofthe
shorter term policy makers. A problem with this, however, is that, unfortunately, they
can be susceptible to the desire to help drive policy by skewing intelligence.
Leadership and policy are shaped by the IC, yet they also allow for the impressive
amount ofsecrecy so characteristic ofthe community. The cloak which covers the IC is
two-fold. Secrecy is important to shield U.S. intelligence work fi*om inquiring eyes, but
too much secrecy often leads to breakdowns in communication, intelligence failures and
other problems, such as the infiingement of personal rights. Information collection
greatly affects the liberties ofthose people from whom it is being gathered because ofthe
ambiguity ofthe laws regarding intelligence gathering. Wire taps on communication
devices, video surveillance, and other forms ofcovert action are in direct conflict with the
idea of Americans’ security in their private lives as enumerated in the Bill of Rights.
Covert intelligence gathering operations are also in direct conflict with the ideals of a free
society, but even though there is no conclusive truth to the effectiveness of covert
operations or their lack thereof, the need for the intelligence gathered is necessary for
securing our nation from foreign threats.

-4-

Although the IC is very secretive, it is important to note that the U.S. intelligence
community is one ofthe most open in the world. Americans can gather vast amounts of
information on the IC on a wide range oftopics. Much ofthe history ofthe IC is readily
available for public use as well as information on its structure, processes, and problems.
but it was not always so open a system as it is today. While the IC was fighting for
permanence in America, the British form ofintelligence was used as a model for
complete secrecy. However,the new nation was trying to distance itself fi*om its former
government and practices. The secrecy ofthe intelligence community inevitably had to
change because ofthe conflicts between secrecy and a fi*ee society. The change was
implemented by Director of Central Intelligence(DCI)Admiral Stansfield Turner who
believed, like many others, that Americans should have information about any system to
which their tax money is given. Thus, he set up the Public Affairs Office and left a
legacy of openness for his successors.(9) Likewise, Richard Shelby,formerly chair of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said that “perfectly secure information is
perfectly useless information.”
The IC is often expected to be an apparatus that eliminates all uncertainty, when
in fact it is in place to reduce uncertainty for decision makers in order for them to make
informed policy decisions.(22) Glamorization ofthe world ofintelligence because ofspy
novels and movies has added to these ideas and stereotypes. They skew the view ofthe
IC, and therefore the reality ofthe IC is cloudy in the minds of Americans, When the IC
fails to “succeed” in preventing catastrophes, whether they are major or minor,
Americans become increasingly impatient and demand to know what happened and why.
They become acutely aware ofthe shortcomings ofthe intelligence community and seek
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to correct the problem by adding another layer, thus perpetuating the cycle of
bureaucracy that divides the IC and diminishes its effectiveness.
The divisiveness ofthe intelligence system has been cultivated from the founding
ofthe U.S. Wars always spawned new and better intelligence while peace time broke it
down. For over one hundred years, the United States did not have any ofsteadfastness in
the field ofintelligence, although some temporary systems cropped up during the
Revolutionary War,the War of 1812,the Mexican War, and the Spanish-American War.
Spy rings were formed, and enemy spy rings were crushed. Messages were coded and
ciphered. Military strategies were written, but during none ofthe inter-war periods ofthe
first one hundred years ofintelligence did the U.S. expand the capabilities ofintelligence
into peace time. American citizens were so adamantly against this idea that even
intelligence during war was not adequately used, resulting in unnecessary defeat and loss
of life. Towards the end ofthe Civil War, U.S. intelligence found staying power through
the efforts ofthe Secret Service and the military. The Secret Service, the Office of Naval
Intelligence(ONI), and the Military Intelligence Division(MID)were founded during
this period, and although their resources and missions drastically declined, they were not
disbanded during the ensuing peace time. The service thrived during World War I with
the successes in signals intelligence(SIGINT), but declined again during peace. After
Pearl Harbor and the Second World War,the United States finally recognized the need
for a standing intelligence community during both war time and peace time in order to
best prevent strategic surprises on America. The National Security Act of 1947 provided
for the first permanent intelligence community in America, and after finding its staying
power, the IC no longer fell in importance during peace time. The U.S. finally saw the
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ability ofintelligence as a means of preventing conflicts rather than simply a means of
making sure we won them.
History has shown the need for the IC to adapt to the environments ofchanging
times. The IC is vastly different from its original state in part because of war, political
scandal, and international terror. U.S. intelligence cannot act in the same way in every
situation. If it were not an adaptable system it would be extremely susceptible to
infiltration by foreign governments and terrorists who seek to destroy our way oflife by
stealing our information. During each era, the IC has made major changes that affect our
country’s security, and it is important to understand what the changes were and why they
were made. We must wonder, however, whether or not increasing intelligence measures
at the expense of personal rights has actually helped secure our nation. Questioning the
status quo is extremely important to today’s society as we deal with an ever present threat
from the Middle East, terror groups around the world, the war in Iraq, nuclear
proliferation in hostile nations like Iran, and new legislation that has greatly expanded the
powers ofthe IC,if only for a few years. The questions that arise challenge us to
consider the problems with the intelligence community as well as its successes in order to
find a compromise between the fear ofsecrecy in government and the increasing need for
secret intelligence in order to combat the new and significant threats to American society.

-7-

Chapter I: War Time Intelligence

The intelligence system in the United States has evolved through a series of
changes over the course ofthe past two hundred and thirty years. These changes can be
categorized into three eras. The first era ofintelligence in the United States is the era of
war time intelligence. From the American Revolution through the Iraq War,intelligence
has played a necessary role in both U.S. victories and defeats, and this fact has been
noticed by the American public throughout the years. The second era ofintelligence
constitutes the era in which permanent war time intelligence agencies were first
introduced. It was during this time that the United States recognized the need for
standing intelligence units that would not be disbanded when wars ended, but would only
flourish during wars. The last era can be considered the modem era ofpermanent
intelligence during war and peace time. After one hundred and seventy years, the U.S.
finally realized the necessity ofa permanent intelligence community that would
continuously engage in intelligence activities during both peace and war time.
The struggle to find balance between personal rights and national security is an
ongoing struggle for the U.S., and it has been since the birth ofthe nation when the
Revolutionary War provided the first outlet for an intelligence system in the United
States. Although in the 1700s the intelligence operations ofthe United States were
thought by many people in the new nation to be undemocratic and representative ofthe
tyranny of their former governments,the American people simultaneously recognized the
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need for intelligence in wartime. Circles ofspies and secret agents were in place
in the American colonies during the latter part ofthe 1700s as hostilities became inflamed
between the colonists and the British. Before the American Revolution, Britain
established a series of security and counterintelligence committees, called the
Committees of Safety, throughout the colonies in order to gather information on the
citizens who were beginning to rebel against British authority. Another series of
committees formed by the British were the Committees of Correspondence, which were
the only means ofcommunication between the British and the colonials, who then
realized the need for information gathering oftheir own in response to the British
intelligence committees.
The colonists began to form groups oftownspeople whose intent was to collect
information on the British. One ofthese groups, the Sons of Liberty, was formed in 1765
in opposition to the Stamp Act, the first unavoidable tax on Americans that imposed a tax
on every piece of printed paper, which had been passed in the British Parliament

as a

check on colonial trade.(2)The Sons of Liberty formed an underground network through
which they were able to relay information on the British to people all over the colonies.
(14) The Mechamcs,led by Paul Revere, was another group ofmen who began to
engaged in espionage and intelligence gathering at the time. Approximately thirty men
would meet up at the Green Dragon tavern every night, and one or two members ofthe
group would slip quietly away to roam the streets, keeping up with the movements and
actions ofthe British occupiers. They gave the information they gathered to John
Hancock, head of the Committee ofPublic Safety who would then report to the rest of the
committee as appointed by the Provincial Congress. Members ofthis committee
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included Samuel Adams, John Adams, and Dr. Benjamin Church, who betrayed his
country by giving this information to the British. His actions later initiated the Espionage
Act of 1776. Before Church’s betrayal, however, Paul Revere’s made his famous ride of
April 18^^, 1775 as a result ofthe information gathered by this group ofspies and his
willingness to gamble with his life for the good of his country.(1) These groups of men
paved the way for their leaders to employ espionage in gathering intelligence, and their
efforts were acknowledged by the Commander ofthe Revolutionaries, General George
Washington.
George Washington was the first American leader to employ espionage in
intelligence gathering. He is revered for recognizing the need for good intelligence fi:om
every angle. Modem spymasters acknowledge his instincts towards intelligence from a
young age as well as his methods ofgathering intelligence and keeping it secret, but even
with good instincts, Washington had to learn new and better methods by trial and very
serious error. (1) He recognized the need for organized intelligence after the death of
spy Nathan Hale in 1776. Hale was a twenty-one year old captain with no training in
espionage or intelligence gathering ofany kind, who volunteered for the job of
infiltrating British lines in New York because no other man,trained or not, would take it.
The job was ill planned and executed, resulting in Hale’s hanging, which prompted
Washington to establish networks ofspies, and over the autumn months of 1776, he
created the first American spy networks.
The most successful ofthese networks was headed by Benjamin Tallmadge. He
recmited Abraham Woodhull who was codenamed “Samuel Culper.” Woodhull
recruited a close fiiend, Robert Townsend, later codenamed “Samuel Culper, Jr.,” after
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Woodhull became uneasy about his position as a spy in Long Island, NY. The Culper
Net ran in both the merchant and social circles gathering information on the British.
Washington found them most helpful because ofthe steady, reliable intelligence they
gathered. The information eventually uncovered a British scheme to create economic
chaos through counterfeit bills as well as their plan to attack the French allied fleet. The
Culper Net was also invaluable in uncovering Benedict Arnold’s treason. Townsend
gave Tallmadge several names ofspies to watch for, including John Anderson. Arnold
also gave notice that a man named Anderson would be looking for him and to give
Anderson no trouble. A critical piece ofinformation led Tallmadge to link John
Anderson with a man who had been captured carrying important documents oftreason to
the British. The man’s name was actually Major John Andre, Arnold’s contact with
British troops. Tallmadge wasted no time in informing General Washington that Arnold
had defected, which disrupted Arnold’s and the British espionage, and it gave the U.S
one of its first intelligence victories.(1,14)
Washington was not only a spy master, but he was also a consumer of
intelligence as well. In a sense, George Washington represents the most cohesive
intelligence system the U.S. has ever had. He provided the means by which information
could be gathered, and he commissioned the gathering. It is evident then that unlike
many modem intelligence gathering agencies, operatives, or networks, Washington
would have no reason to distort any of the information he gathered or received for policy
making. He was also particular about the kinds ofspies he employed and always asserted
that the spies he wanted were those who wanted the job out ofloyalty to America rather
than for money. The fledgling United States had no real provisions for intelligence;
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therefore it would be very easy for the enemy to out pay a spy.(10) Volunteers made up
the bulk ofthe American intelligence community throughout the Revolutionary War, and
although they were loyal, they could not be retained during peacetime.
Espionage was an important tool during the Revolution and in the birth of
America as a unified nation, but it had many faults. Two ofthe most important faults
were in efficacy and Constitutional balance. There were many intelligence successes
during the Revolutionary War, but there were many failures as well, especially in the
realm of counterintelligence. There has been a lot ofspeculation as to whether Benjamin
Franklin was one of America’s most influential diplomatic spies or if he was one of
America’s most duped leaders. Dr. Edward Bancroft was in Franklin’s service during the
war, but he was also in the service ofthe British. There has been no conclusive evidence
as to whether or not Franklin knew ofBancroft’s treason and fed him counterintelligence.
The other major fault with the integration ofa standing, cohesive intelligence system
within the U.S. government stemmed fi-om the many dichotomies regarding intelligence
written into the Constitution after the Revolution. The founding fathers did not
“establishing a permanent bureaucracy that would perpetuate an institutional memory of
tradecraft and allied practices.”(10) These faults heavily contributed to the skepticism of
American attitudes toward intelligence.
Intelligence was a major part of American life during times of war and, at that
time, as a way to monitor the activities ofthe tyrannical British forces. It was mainly
focused on military strategy rather than on policy, but an intelligence system that
continually gathered and analyzed information even in times ofpeace was a concept that
fiightened most Americans because oftheir fear ofa large government with the ability to
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permeate private society. Therefore, after the first American war concluded, intelligence
activities ofthe government and military ceased to exist. The people’s fear was reflected
by the dismantling of all intelligence networks, and the founding fathers recognized it by
means of omitting any provisions for intelligence gathering fi*om the U.S. Constitution.
They even went so far as to explicitly state in the Bill ofRights that without proper
reason,“The right ofthe people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects...shall not be violated.” On the other hand, it the founders also recognized the
great need for some form ofintelligence. In order to appease the citizens ofthe

new

country while at the same time ^low for growth ofintelligence, they wrote Article II,
Sections 2 and 3 into the Constitution giving the President command over the military
and the ability to take action in the instances where laws were faithfully executed.(1,3,
20) These Presidential powers became important implications ofthe Commander in
Chiefs ability to call intelligence to his service at any time. Americans found themselves
in a catch-22 as they could neither live with or without intelligence for survival. It is
necessary to remember though, that U.S. intelligence is contingent upon Americans
allowing their rights to be infiinged upon.
In 1790, only a few years after the founding ofthe United States, Congress passed
a bill appropriating funds to former General turned President Washington by means of a
“Contingent Fund ofForeign Intercourse.” This is considered the first congressional
appropriations for intelligence even though it was not explicitly stated for intelligence.
The provisions did not, however, require the president to reveal the ways in which he
used the money,thus bringing “intelligence” spending to 12% ofthe fledging nation’s
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budget.* (14, 23) This action set a precedence for secrecy in intelligence spending which
has further compounded the rights versus security debate.
The interwar years showed no real improvement or growth in intelligence circles,
but Westward expansion rekindled the need for intelligence gathering. Presidents sent
their spies to learn the intentions of other nations and to gather information about the
Western lands ofthe country. The most well-known instances ofintelligence used by
America’s leaders during the period of expansion between the Revolutionary War and the
War of 1812 are the Lewis and Clark expedition and the Zebulan Pike expedition.
President Thomas Jefferson commissioned the Lewis and Clark expedition of
1804-1806 supposedly as an expedition solely to extend external commerce.(14)
Jefferson actually commissioned the army officers to find out who inhabited the land
west of the Mississippi River as well as to seek out areas offortification in case of
commerce or expansion into those areas. The expedition had to be commissioned under
legal pretexts because the lands to be explored were, at the time Captain Meriwether
Lewis and Lieutenant William Clark received their order, in the hands of nations with
whom the United States was at peace. To conduct espionage in these areas was a serious
breach of trust between the U.S. and the owners ofthe respective lands that had the
potential to lead to war. If caught, Lewis and Clark were to tell their captors that they
were simply looking for the Northwest Passage, a fabled route fi’om the Atlantic to the
Pacific. Fortunately for these men, the danger ofcapture was eased only a short tune
before their departure when the United States bought the Louisiana Territory fi'om the

* Washington used the bulk offunds from the Contingent Fund ofForeign Intercourse to ransom American
hostages ofthe Barbary pirates. He also used the funds to “buy peace” when he paid offforeign officials.
(15)

- 14-

French. The Louisiana Purchase enabled Lewis and Clark to search the territory without
the added fears of being apprehended by a foreign power and tried and hung as spies.
The expedition of Lieutenant Zebulon Pike in 1805-1807 was another instance of
intelligence during America’s Westward expansion. Pike was sent to explore the Spanish
areas of the Southwest. He was supposed to seek out the Red River and Santa Fe and
gather information on the Spanish activities in the area. During his mission he was
apprehended by the Spanish near the Rio Grande, which he thought was the Red River.
He successfully found what later came to be known as “Pike’s Peak” in the Rocky
Mountains and the Rio Grande River. Upon his capture the Spaniards took Pike to Santa
Fe then Chihuahua, thus allowing him the opportunity to finish his espionage work and
later report his findings to the U.S. government when he returned to American lands. His
expedition gave America knowledge ofthe vast Southwest, which became for it a
valuable resource. (1,14) These intelligence operations, which endangered the young
nation’s peace, caused no outcry among the general public because oftheir covert
natures. In other words, no one even knew what the government was doing. The actions
were illegal, and they were in direct conflict with the fledgling democracy’s values.
Westward Expansion was closely followed by the expansion ofthe Americas into
Spanish territory in Florida. Negotiations and clandestine operations on the parts of
President James Madison, James Monroe, and their agents resulted in the annexation of
the Floridas into the United States, but this operation had a lot ofintelligence flaws
including the subsequent failure to cover their plotting from the British and Spanish with
whom the United States eventually waged the War of 1812.(14,23)
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One ofthe few aspects ofintelligence to emerge from the war was an army unit of
topographical engineers. Sixteen men made up this unit that only lasted until the end of
the war. Their mission was “to accompany all reconnoitering parties sent out to obtain
intelligence of the movements ofthe enemy or his position, etc.; to make sketches oftheir
route, accompanied by written notes of everything worthy of observation.”(14) This unit
was, as tradition demanded, disbanded after the war’s end, but these sixteen men,the
Army Corps ofTopographical Engineers, paves the way for organized intelligence units
to enter into the American government.^ Americans at all levels of government and
society began loosening their tight grip on ambivalent attitudes towards intelligence.
They were content because they did not feel their security was truly threatened. It wasn’t
until after the Civil War,in which another intelligence draught occurred, that a
bureaucratically organized government intelligence system truly arose.
The Mexican War was no exception to the rise and fall cycle ofintelligence
during conflict. The circumstances surrounding the outset of war in April of 1846 were
based on covert action. President James K.Polk led the United States into a war that
many people believed was manifest destiny. On the other hand, many members of
Congress, including a young legislator named Abraham Lincoln, were opposed to the
idea of manifest destiny and U.S. expansion into Mexican territory. These lofty ideas
called for unsettling the peace, which allowed the rights versus security issue to slowly
build heat. In order for Congress to approve a war with Mexico,the Mexicans would

^ In 1938, the Army Corps of Topographical Engineers was reorganized. It became the first real
intelligence unit ofthe federal government.(1) Today’s Engineers are commissioned with similar duties,
though not in terms ofexpansionism. Their mission is “to provide the war fighter with a superior
knowledge ofthe battlefield and to support the nation's civil and environmental initiatives. This mission is
accomplished through research, development, and the application of expertise in the topographic and
related sciences.”(15)
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have to incite aggression against the United States’ newly annexed Texas. Polk knew
there was no other way to expand America’s land boundaries into the Rio Grande and
California areas without war, so he planned a covert move to aggravate the Mexicans.
He sent U.S. Army General Zachary Taylor and his detachment to Texas as a means of
“protection,” but in reality the detachment was sent to provoke the Mexicans. Polk’s plan
was successful, and the Mexicans crossed the Rio Grande, attacked Taylor’s troops, and
killed sixteen ofthem on April 25,1846, effectively beginning the U.S.-Mexican War.(1,
14) Though begun through clandestine means,the trend of espionage and other cover
action did not proceed during the war. Only a very few instances ofintelligence use are
known, and ofthose, the intelligence was rarely beneficial to the United States.
Only a few years after the U.S.-Mexican War,the United States was plunged into
a conflict that would ultimately take the lives of more Americans in a single war than in
any other war. In 1861 the conflicting issues ofstates’ rights, slavery, sectionalism, and
differing lifestyles in the North and South culminated in America’s darkest hour, the
Civil War. The war years, fi-om 1861-1865, were just as dark for U.S. intelligence.
Brothers were fighting brothers in the war as family loyalties were split between the
Northern and Southern causes. These conditions were both the best and worst for
intelligence gathering and espionage. With ambiguity surrounding loyalties, men could
spy at will and no one would ever know. At the same time, though, suspicions were
never more aroused as to espionage, and men and women fi-om both sides were suspected
to be spies, even ifthey had nothing to do with the war efforts. More people were
imprisoned for espionage than in past wars, and more people were kept under
surveillance in hopes ofcatching spies.
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Counterintelligence, the efforts to catch spies and throw offthe enemy by
providing false information, was the major part ofintelligence during the Civil War.
Military and government leaders had no system in place for attaining intelligence, and
this proved detrimental to both sides. There were, ofcourse, isolated instances of
espionage, and even a few spy rings were in place as with other wars, but the state of
intelligence during the Civil War was arguably the worst it has been throughout history.
Some ofthe most famous spies to emerge from the Civil War years are famous in name
and in legend, but the truth to their tales are far from glorious.
Allen Pinkerton was the first “private eye” in the United States, and the story
surrounding his importance during the war includes the successful aversion ofan
assassination attempt on the life of Abraham Lincoln during a trip through Baltimore,
Maryland. The circumstances surrounding the event never completely came to light, and
it is widely theorized that Pinkerton made the plot up as a way to put himselfin good
graces with the president. Lincoln questioned Pinkerton as to whether the plot was true
or ifthe cloaked trip through Baltimore was simply a way to humiliate him.^ Pinkerton,
although good at private eye and detective work, could not correlate those abilities to
military type intelligence. He consistently overestimated the enemy forces, and he spun
intelligence analysis, which led to the ultimate breakdown ofhis role as a leader in
intelligence.
After the fall ofthis supposed great leader of covert operations, a new name in
intelligence arose when Lafayette C. Baker took over espionage operations. Baker was a
ruthless, cold man who would go to any lengths to get information or to oust spies. Many

Upon amval in Washington,President Lincoln became the brunt ofjokes and caricatures by opposition
newspapers of his surreptitious journey from Philadelphia through Baltimore.(14)
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people criticized his methods of abuse and entrapment, which were known to produce
results, but those results were often unsatisfactory because history shows that intelligence
gained through intimidation is likely false as coercion usually results in mixed or wrong
facts. In response. Baker said,“War is a last and terrible resort in the defense ofeven a
righteous cause, and sets at defiance all ofthe ordinary laws and customs ofsociety.”
(14) America’s ordinary laws and societal customs are often suspended during times of
war, a tradition that began during the Revolution and was severely overused during the
Civil War. Personal rights were nearly nonexistent as the nation struggled to remain
unified; security ofthe United States became everything. When the war ended, however,
the tables again turned, and intelligence operations were almost totally suspended in
order to better preserve the rights of all people.
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Chapter II: Beginnings ofa Permanent Intelligence System
The beginnings of a permanent intelligence system in the United States appeared
during the immediate post-Civil War years. In his last cabinet meeting before being
assassinated in 1865, President Abraham Lincoln established the United States Secret
Service. (10) Originally designed to investigate counterfeiters, the Service was
expanded in 1867 for the purpose of"detecting persons perpetrating frauds against the
government."^(19) The post-Civil War years also brought about other changes to the IC.
After the Civil War,the U.S. Navy became a ghost force when it failed to convert from
wood to steel and from sail to steam. When the U.S. Navy engaged in intelligence
gathering missions in order to acquire better technology, they realized the immense
technology gap that existed between its navy and foreign navies. In response to these
findings, the Office ofNaval Intelligence(ONI)and the Military Intelligence Division
(MID)were founded in 1882 and 1885 respectively. ONI was established as an
intelligence clearinghouse and charged with maintaining a more systematic way of
collecting information. The U.S. Army followed the Navy’s lead in creating a unit
responsible for collecting and disseminating foreign intelligence when it created the MID.
(1)It took over one hundred years and four wars to pass into history before America
officially entered the world of organized intelligence. The first permanent intelligence
units were in place, and they set a new precedence for foreign intelligence gathering. The
® Thirty years later, eight members of the Secret Service became the nucleus of what was to become the
FBI, but it was not until the year 1951 that Congress passed a bill giving permanentjurisdiction over
presidential protection to the Secret Service.(19)
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U.S. intelligence system still severely lacked the size, cohesion, and permanent
status it needed in order to be effective, but ONI and MID did represent the beginnings of
a permanent intelligence community by their commission as standing war time
intelligence units.
A few years later, these intelligence units were put to the test during the SpanishAmerican War. In 1898 war broke out between the United States and Spain over Spanish
territory in Cuba and the Philippines after the battleship Maine blew up in February 1898
at what many believed to be the hands ofthe Spanish. The new intelligence units knew
ofthe possibility of war with Spain before it was declared on April 25, and their
information was used to first defeat the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay,then to defeat the
Spanish fleet in Cuba. The naval battle in Manila was quickly and easily determined
because the Assistant Secretary ofthe Navy, Theodore Roosevelt, had been in the process
of preparing the U.S. naval fleet for war long before the battle. He emphasized
intelligence work for two reasons. First, he believed that the chief of Naval intelligence
should be “the man upon whom we can rely for initiating strategic work.” The second
reason he emphasized intelligence was his special interest in the ONI, which began
developing secret codes used in transmitting information about Latin and South Amenca.
The ONI also began to take part in topographical intelligence and strategic map-making
that would affect U.S. foreign policy in Latin and South America. (14)
Another intelligence victory during the Spanish American War is credited to John
Wilkie. He took the job as Chiefofthe United States Secret Service after his predecessor
William P. Hazen. Hazen was blamed for hiring based on patronage and extending the
powers ofthe Secret Service to guard the president even though this power was not
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achieved through legislative approval, and he was demoted after failing to combat a
major counterfeiting scheme that ultimately caused the U.S. to recall and reprint an entire
issue of currency. Public outcry in response to the failure to detect the counterfeiting
scheme and its major impact on the economy was detrimental for intelligence. Citizens
demanded better intelligence for their security. The job Wilkie walked into was not an
easy one, and it took a major effort on his part to bring the Secret Service back into the
good graces ofthe American public. The War of 1898 afforded him that opportumty
through the demise ofa Spanish spy ring set up in Montreal, Canada by Ramon de
Carranza, a Spanish naval attach^. Carranza first recruited George Downing,a U.S.
naturalized English immigrant who served as a petty officer on the navy cruiser,
Brooklyn. The Secret Service’s stints into counterespionage served them well as they
listened through the thin walls ofa hotel suite to Carranza giving Downing instructions
on what information he needed to obtain. Downing was captured after that incident, but
it took more evidence to deport Carranza. The opportunity arose soon after Dowmng s
capture when Carranza wrote a letter to his cousin that included incriminating
information on himself and another ofthe ring’s spies, Frank Mellors. When the letter
was found, the information was made public world wide, and Carranza was deported
from the British territory. After Carranza’s departure firom Canada, it is widely believed
that the Montreal spy ring was disbanded and could no longer obtain and use information
against the United States, which was a huge victory not only for the Secret Service, but
also for counterespionage within the U.S. intelligence system.(10)
After the initial attack in Manila, the Spanish fleet acknowledged that they had to
become more prepared and discreet in their strategies led to a game ofhide and seek in
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the warm waters of the Caribbean. Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete commanded the
Spanish West Indies Fleet. Before the outbreak of war, Cervera caused rumors of war to
circulate in the highest levels ofthe American government when he refitted his fleet of
ships. After war began, he evaded U.S. intelligence as to his fleet’s whereabouts in the
Caribbean. Admiral Cervera’s fleet left Cape Verde on April 29,1898 to an unknown
location, leaving the citizens on the Atlantic Coast ofthe U.S. believing he would attack
along the Eastern seaboard. In response to public outcry, the U.S. sent three squadrons
on the search for Cervera and the missing West Indies fleet. The squadrons went to Key
West, Hampton Roads, and the Delaware Capes. Rear Admiral William T. Sampson,
Commodore Winfield S. Schley, and the captains ofarmed merchant ships led the
missions respectively. Schley and the merchant ships did not see the military action that
Sampson and his squadron encountered, but it took Sampson an entire month to take
action on intelligence leads as to Cervera’s whereabouts and finally bottleneck the
Spanish fleet at the entrance to the Santiago harbor. One ofthe most important messages
ofthe war, intercepted by the Key West-Havana spy ring led by Martin L. Hellings

on

May 19, told the exact location of Cervera’s fleet. After getting this information, leaders
in Washington, D.C. decided it was improbable that Cervera would have put his fleet into
a possible bottleneck situation, and they disregarded the message and its implications.
Cervera had nine more days ofsecurity at Santiago before Sampson’s arrival. (14)
Although some military and government leaders like Roosevelt prepared for war with
Spain through the use ofintelligence, there many others, like Sampson, were not prepared
and did not rely on available intelligence. This is a good example ofone ofthe inherent
problems with intelligence that has been prevalent throughout history; the simple fact that
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some U.S. leaders choose not to use the information in their decision making process or
they believe the intelligence is not necessary for success.
In 1898, Secretary of State Robert M. Lansing responded to the need for better
organization for intelligence by instructing Frank L. Polk to supervise domestic
intelligence. His job as departmental counselor was to keep the various intelligence units
in line. The goal was a sort ofintelligence integration that would keep repetition of
information to a minimum and would keep one intelligence unit from crossing the
investigation of another. The early intelligence bureaucracy included the Secret Service,
military intelligence, Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Justice Department’s Bureau
of Investigation, a precursor to the FBI. One ofPolk’s first actions in his new
supervisory position was to contact Sir Cecil Spring Rice, the British Ambassador. He
asked Sir Rice for permission to speak with the head ofthe American branch ofthe
British Secret Service, and although he was told that position did not exist, he was
contacted by a man named Sir William Wiseman. Wiseman and Polk formed an alliance
among intelligence units that would help the United States pursue its own intelligence
community. (14)This alliance preceded both World Wars, and it would be copied
through the efforts oftwo very important men during World War II.
The IC stagnated after the Spanish-American War because intelligence successes
occurred at the outset ofthe war and waned as the war continued. John Wilkie’s
successful ousting ofthe Montreal spy ring constituted one ofthe most important
successes in intelligence to that point, but even in light ofthat turning point, the
intelligence community was put on the back burner of American government and policy
as the war ended.(10)After conflict among high-ranking government officials, MID was
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finally transferred to the Army War College. It became something of a research and
archival unit during peacetime, and it was finally abolished in favor of completely
merging MID into the War College, which was then renamed, G-2. (1)
Military intelligence was not in the dark for long, but its stint in the light only
lasted the length ofthe First World War. When war erupted in Europe in July of 1914,
G-2 was virtually nonexistent, but as the United States held a neutral position until 1917,
most people did not see its potential importance. While American citizens wanted to
remain neutral, even reelecting President Woodrow Wilson on his slogan “He Kept Us
Out of War,” the international conflict found a home in the hearts and minds of all
Americans on May 7,1915 when a German submarine sank the British liner, Lusitania,
killing over 1,000 passengers of which 124 were U.S. citizens. Subsequent German Uboat attacks because of German instituted unrestricted submarine warfare encouraged
President Wilson to finally sever all diplomatic ties with the belligerent country on
February 3, 1917, but not even the severed diplomacy between the two states was enough
to bring about a declaration of war. The United States did not enter the Great War until
April 6, 1917 after an intelligence incident that had the most profound impact on America
that any piece ofinformation had previously enjoyed.(3)
The infamous Zimmerman Telegram that finally vaulted the United States into
WWI was intercepted by British intelligence on January 16,1917, but it was not revealed
to American leaders until early the following month. The British hoped the United States
would enter into the war because ofthe German declaration ofunrestricted submarine
warfare, but when that did not happen, MI-6 revealed the telegram that made its way
through the bureaucracy ofdiplomacy and government into the hands ofPresident
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Wilson who had it leaked to the press. The telegram was originally written by Arthur
Zimmerman, Germany’s Foreign Minister, to the German Ambassador to Mexico,
Heinrich J.F. von Eckhardt.(1)Zimmerman’s message to Eckhardt included information
on the declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare as well as directions to form an
alliance with Mexico against the United States in the event that the U.S. entered the war.
The German-Mexican alliance would ensure that Mexico would regain territory it has lost
to the U.S. in previous wars. The alliance would also profit from Japanese adherence.(3)
With these German plans laid out on the world table, the United States could do nothing
but join the Allied forces in Europe to defeat Germany and the Central Powers.
While the Zimmerman Telegram was a vital piece ofintelligence during the First
World War, it was a coded transmission that U.S. intelligence had absolutely no part in
deciphering. At the time of her entry into WWI,America was almost completely reliant
on British and French intelligence on the Central Powers. General John J. Pershing
instituted an intelligence unit within his American Expeditionary Force, but his soldiers
were not trained in any type ofintelligence gathering or analysis. Reliance on foreign
powers for intelligence was a trend the United States followed in almost every war xmtil
the early to mid part ofthe twentieth century. Even with the expansion ofintelligence
units within the U.S. government, reliance on foreign information was necessary because
the fledgling U.S. intelligence community had no prior experience with intelligence and
covert operations at the organized level. Americans simply felt that intelligence was only
necessary for their security during war, and they limited the IC severely because they
were afraid intelligence operations would infringe upon their rights.
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With the outset of World War I came the typical resurgence ofsanctioned U.S.
intelligence so as not to fall into complete reliance on foreign intelligence, specifically
the Military Intelligence Division. G-2 blossomed during the First World War largely

^

because of the efforts of Major Ralph Van Deman and Lieutenant Colonel Marlborough
Churchill. These men revived the institution, which had originated in 1903 as part ofthe
U.S. Army’s adoption ofthe European “general staff’ concept, fi:om its dilapidated state
in the Army War College by exploiting domestic counterintelligence and concentrating
efforts on cryptology. When he first took over G-2 in 1917, Van Deman was abhorred by
its state and issued a statement to his superiors saying.
To sum up the whole matter in a single sentence, we are no better
prepared, insofar as organization for intelligence duties in the filed are
concerned, than we were the day the General Staff was created, and

as

far as military information is concerned, we are not so well prepared since
much of the information on hand at that time has not since been corrected
or added to and is now so old as to be practically worthless.(14)
Van Deman’s words were harsh, but his subsequent actions in revamping G-2 were a
testament to his ultimate commitment to the success of an intelligence community within
the United States.
During WWI,G-2 expanded to 282 officers, 29 noncommissioned officers, and
948 civilian employees. The most significant and drastic changes Van Deman made
included the creation ofthe Code and Cipher section of MID,or MI-8,in June of 1917.
One ofthe first and most important steps he took in securing the prosperity of his
intelligence units was to hire Herbert 0. Yardley, a young code-clerk at the State
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Department. When Van Deman hired Yardley to take over MI-8, Yardley was
commissioned a Second Lieutenant after which he built a system ofintelligence that
ultimately solved over 10,000 diplomatic messages in and among nine countries
including: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Germany, Mexico, Spain, and
Panama.(1)
The creation and expansion of MI-8 was not the only major change that took
place within G-2 during WWI. The reorganization ofthe army general staffin August of
1918 was vital to the intelligence effort. Until then, intelligence had been a small branch
ofservice with little or no prestige and almost as little recognition as an important
military division. After the reorganization, however, G-2 had recognition as one ofthe
principal divisions ofthe general staff. There were four divisions, but it was G-2’s
responsibility for planning, coordinating, and supervising military intelligence in all its
aspects. Although G-2 saw these changes, a rise in activity and prestige during WWI,
and was on par with most modem intelligence organizations except in the areas of
espionage, peacetime again had its grave affect on intelligence, and the years between the
First and Second World Wars deflated intelligence operations.(1)
There were a few major reasons the IC deteriorated during the interwar years, and
those are due to public opinion in the last years ofthe war and in the years following. An
interesting aspect of public opinion ofintelligence during this particular period is that
although Americans generally feared intelligence and its intmsion on their private lives,
they had no problem with the expansion ofintelligence for the public safety as shown by
the Alien and Sedition Acts as well as the Espionage Act passed immediately after WWI.
Americans feared anything anti-American and the hysteria that arose as a response to the
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emerging super powers during WWI had a detrimental affect on U.S. civil liberties and
eventually, on the intelligence entities. A series oflaws were passed from 1917-1919 that
greatly affected civilian views on intelligence. The first was the Espionage Act of 1917,
which was in many ways very similar to its predecessor of 1776 and said that “false
statements with the intent to obstruct military operations, including enlistment and
recruiting activities” were against the law. The second was the Sedition Act of 1918
which made it unlawful to “utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scumlous,
or abusive language” in regards to America’s government, military, or constitution. The
Alien Law passed in October 1918 furthered its sister laws by making it unlawful for
anarchists and anyone advocating violence in overthrowing the U.S. government to enter
the United States, and the law said that those people holding these beliefs who already
lived in the U.S. would be deported.(1)The United State Supreme Court backed these
laws by stating that “The most stringent protection offree speech would not protect a
man falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing panic.” (7)Ironically, these laws and
the ensuing prejudice against foreign people in America caused as much or more pamc
than the radicals.
Instead of fighting for civil liberties in conjunction with public safety, Americans
simply succumbed to the hysteria that followed these laws. Hysteria was massive and
widespread, and not only did the populous ofAmerica find it completely necessary for
intelligence to remain integral during peacetime, but it also found complete necessity in
spying on its neighbors, family, and fiiends. Americans did not fight for the positive
side ofintelligence; rather they fought desperately for the purging offoreign people from
American society. They fought behind U.S. Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer when
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he instituted the Red Scare of 1919 and arbitrarily arrested and deported many
immigrants from American soil. Even J. Edgar Hoover took part in the expansion ofthe
farce of peacetime intelligence when, as a young member ofthe General Intelligence
Division of the Bureau of Investigation, he compiled a list ofradical leaders and
organizations who were to be arrested, deported, or monitored carefully.(1) Amencans
found no balance between personal rights and national security. They felt threatened,

so

security became the more important issue, but it is the delicate balance between the two
that will allow each to thrive. Unfortunately this is a part of American history that has
occurred time and time again.
It was because ofthe mass hysteria that flowed swiftly throughout American
society at the end of WWI and the apathy that quickly followed, that the IC again
dissipated from its heightened state during the war. Neither the citizens nor the
government of the United States listened to the words of General Churchill on the
importance ofthe intelligence division he took over from Van Deman.
There is hardly an officer who does not recognize that at a GHQ and at
the headquarters of every army, corps, division and similar umt, G-3
(Plans)cannot make good plans unless G-2 furnish good information. We
take that truth for granted, but what is less often emphasized is the fact
that there must be a G-2 in the War department performing a similar
function, not only with the War Plans Division in the initiation and
perfection ofplans, but also concurrently with the State Department in the
work of prediction upon which national policy is based.
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Churchill’s statement was based on both intelligence history and his own years of
military experience and understanding, and althou^ all Americans shared history and
many Americans shared his experience, no one shared his understanding until the Pearl
Harbor disaster, and the most devastating event to occur on U.S. soil since the Civil War.
During the interwar years, there was little intelligence work being carried on in
the United States. There were no intelligence agencies outside the military, and among
those intelligence units, there was no single unit through which information was passed
so as not to be duplicated or lost. The main intelligence work being done was in the field
of cryptology, and even that work was embroiled in controversy. In other words, U.S.
intelligence was segmented and generally ineffective. If not for Herbert O. Yardley and
G-2’s MI-8, the United States would have been completely in the dark on intelligence
matters and information gathering.
Yardley was probably the most famous cryptologist in the world, and he is still
considered one ofthe greatest cryptologists of all time. As a code clerk in the U.S.
Department of State, he solved diplomatic codes for fim in a matter of hours. He could
decode all ofthe president’s correspondence, and for this his work was sought after by
Ralph Van Deman to be used in the field ofintelligence. During and immediately
following WWI,he worked diligently and purposefully to keep cryptology at the
forefront of U.S. intelligence, and for a time, it was his work that allowed the United
States to rely not on information given by other countries, but on its own signals
intelligence(SIGINT).
SIGINT did not remain solely a part ofthe military for long after WWL Yardley
lobbied General Marlborough Churchill and Secretary of State Frank Polk for a
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peacetime cipher unit. His success in this area was the institution ofthe American Black
Chamber, part of MID,but the entire staff was civilian. Black Chamber received money
both from the War Department and the Department of State. Throughout the ten years it
was in existence, Yardley’s Black Chamber solved over forty-five thousand cryptograms,
reading the diplomatic messages of twenty countries. During this time, however,the first
problems between U.S. foreign intelligence and domestic law emerged, and these
problems would eventually be the death curtain for Yardley’s career with the U.S.
government and the Black Chamber. In 1929, when Henry L. Stimson became Secretary
of State, the Black Chamber was shut down as an unethical use of State Department
money. Ironically, Stimson later changed his opinion ofcode breaking and became a
staunch proponent ofthose U.S. operations, but unfortunately for Yardley and the U.S.,
Stimson did not change his mind soon enough. In retaliation for the way he was treated,
Yardly wrote books on his work that revealing information which caused the Japanese to
change their codes again. Before its demise, though, Yardley’s Black Chamber provided
the United States with one ofthe greatest SIGINT successes it had ever seen.
In 1922 America called for a conference to limit naval armament in order “to
contribute to the maintenance ofthe general peace, and to reduce the burdens of
competition in armament.”(29)The conference included the United States, the British
Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, and it was marked by tense negotiation among the
countries. What America needed most was information regarding the positions ofthe
countries with whom they were negotiating on the lowest amount ofarmaments to which
they would agree. The information was highly sensitive, and the only way to attain it was
by intercepting and deciphering diplomatic messages sent from the home countries to
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their ambassadors. Yardley and his “black chamber” team’s mission was clear, and
through their work came one of Yardley’s most important and memorable achievements.
He was invaluable in getting the U.S. the information needed to negotiate the best terms
with the Japanese. Yardley broke the new Japanese code of 1919 within six months,
which allowed him to decipher Japanese messages during the conference and give the
U.S. their needed information. With the information on how low the Japanese would
negotiate in armament, the United States was able to stand firm in her position. (1)
After losing Yardley and the secrets to Japanese codes, the U.S. had to step up in
their code breaking efforts. The new hero of SIGINT was WolfFrederick Friedman.
After a year of work, and in the midst of a worsening world situation, Friedman and his
team of Army SIS broke the Japanese type A codes for high-level diplomatic traffic in
1936. The SIS team developed code-breaking machines that would ultimately help
change the U.S. position on the Second World War,but they did not achieve this success
until 1940, after the Japanese had changed their codes another two times. The lumped
Japanese codes were called “MAGIC,” and they were restricted to use by a very limited
circle of decision makers, which did not include some leaders in intelligence. (1)
What the U.S. did not break, however, were German codes, so it had to rely on
British intelligence in this area. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and U.S.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt decided to share technical information in light of
obvious alliance that was soon to emerge. A full exchange of cryptographic information
4c4c

was supposed to take place, but although the United States delivered a MAGIC machine
to the British, the British never reciprocated the deal. America’s reliance on foreign

«*
The machine was originally intended for use at the naval base at Pearl Harbor.
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intelligence, even intelligence of an ally, backfired tremendously, and the U.S. had to
continue using British intelligence to receive decoded German messages.
At the beginning of WWII the SIS had nineteen members, which was previously
sufficient, but in light of the rapidly growing need for intelligence and amount of coded
Japanese messages, the SIS grew to 331 members by December 7, 1941. The Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor prompted the Unites States into war causing more reliance on
intelligence and code breaking. By the end of WWII,SIS had approximately 13,000 staff
members. The steep climb in SIGINT’s size and importance allowed for more
information to find its way into the hands of policy makers, but it is obvious from the
events leading up to the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor that code breaking alone as a
source of intelligence was simply not enough to avert disaster. Attempts have been made
throughout history to accuse U.S. leadership of allowing the attack in order to catapult the
U.S. into WWII, but these accusations are false. The leaders did not conceal the truth
from the American public; instead, they did not use the resources at hand and did not
utilize the intelligence apparatus that were in place. The IC had no cohesive system
through which U.S. leaders and policy makers during the early part of WWII could attain
timely, accurate, and cohesive information because Americans believed that cohesion in
the IC would spawn a big brother state.
The attack on Pearl Harbor prompted many investigations, but the first
investigation to receive Top Secret Security clearance was performed by Henry Clausen.
Clausen was able to investigate the attack more thoroughly than any other person
previously because he was able to view all documents needed to manifest the truth. His
findings pushed him to assert that the lack of a good intelligence community was one of
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the most detrimental aspects of the failures to predict and preempt the Pearl Harbor
attack.(6)The Joint Congressional Committee on the Pearl Harbor Attack agreed with
Clausen and concluded that the Hawaiian commands had failed on specific points of
intelligence, and they outlined these problems in an extensive report published after the
investigation and hearings. In it they said that
8. Specifically, the Hawaiian commandsfailed—
(a) To discharge their responsibilities in the light ofthe warnings receivedfrom
Washington, other information possessed by them, and the principle ofcommand
by mutual cooperation,
(b) To integrate and coordinate theirfacilitiesfor defense and to alertproperly
the Army and Navy establishments in Hawaiiparticularly in the light ofthe
warnings and intelligence available to them during the period November 27 to
December 7, 1941.
(c) To effect liaison on a basis designed to acquaint each ofthem with the
operations ofthe other, which was necessary to theirjoint security, and to
exchangefully all significant intelligence...
(g) To appreciate the significance ofintelligence and other information available
to them. (25)
In light ofthe congressional committee’s findings along with those of Henry Clausen and
the ensuing World War,the United States could no longer put its intelligence community
on the back burner.
The factors that prompt change in American intelligence depend partly on the
events played out on the world stage at any given time, and during the 1940s, the Second
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World War was a major inciter of change. Our nation’s leaders could not keep up with
the major impacts of decisions made by foreign leaders because they did not have the
intelligence at hand required for gathering and analyzing pertinent information.
American intelligence was, at that time, a joke among foreign states not because ofits
lack of effectiveness, but because ofthe lack of a cohesive intelligence commumty. In
the words of Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini, the United States “must have” the best
intelligence system in the world “for no one has been able to ever discover it.”(1)Other
countries, however, saw the potential for success in the U.S. intelligence community.
Those allies provided the United States with indispensable help in cultivating a more
cohesive system for gathering, analyzing, and disseminating information. Britain was the
most helpful ally in the drive for a better U.S. intelligence community. Their intelligence
divisions had been in place since 1909, and they had the experience the U.S. needed.(8)
The United States had the strength, the numbers,the willpower, and the capabilities
necessary for a cohesive IC, and with the experience of British intelligence, a new era of
U.S. intelligence was bom.
According to British Intelligence history, a man named Sir William Stephenson
took on the role of director of British Security Coordination. As part ofthis post’s duties,
Stephenson, also known as “the quiet Canadian’ or ‘Intrepid,” was to gain full American
assistance in the war effort. In so doing, Stephenson acquainted himself with Colonel
William Donovan with whom he shared the ins and outs ofthe British Intelligence
system. He hoped to impress upon Donovan the importance of and need for a similar
American intelligence system that could work with British intelligence. In agreement
with Stephenson on the need for a centralized U.S. intelligence system, Donovan took the
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idea to President Roosevelt who sent him on further fact-finding missions. For about a
year, Donovan acted as the chief intelligence officer for Roosevelt,traveling to Britain
and the Middle East to gather pertinent pre-war information. After these trips and the
meetings with Stephenson, Donovan proposed to President Roosevelt that he set up a
Coordinator of Information(COI)as a step forward in creating a new U.S. intelligence
system.(21) The COI formed on July 11, 1941 with Roosevelt’s direct authorization to
collect and analyze all information and data, which may bear upon national
security: to correlate such information and data, and to make such information
and data available to the President and to such departments and officials ofthe
Government as the President may determine; and to carry out, when requested by
the President, such supplementary activities as may facilitate the securing of
information important for national security not now available to the Government.
(22)
While the nation became more secure, the new operations given to Donovan had
potentially grave effects on personal rights, but during his time as acting COI,Donovan
cultivated his ideas for a larger, centralized intelligence system that “performed
exclusively the functions ofproducing strategic intelligence (research and analysis) and
performing clandestine operations(espionage and covert action).”(1)It wasn’t imtil the
inception ofthe Office of Strategic Services(OSS)on June 13, 1942 that Donovan’s
ideas for the U.S. intelligence system came closer to reality.
The OSS was commissioned to “collect and analyze...strategic information” and
“plan and operate...special services,” under the supervision ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff,
which gave it a military character and military support. OSS did not assume the
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functions of all existing intelligence units, but it did centralize some aspects that Donovan
was looking for. Its structure in 1944 provides a good basis for studying the OSS and the
impact it had on the structure of the modem intelligence community,specifically the
Central Intelligence Agency. At the top ofthe OSS were the Director, Assistant Director,
Planning Group and Staff, and Advisory Committee. The major components of operation
within OSS were categorized under the Deputy Director Intelligence(DDI)and Deputy
Director of Operations(DDO). The DDI was in charge ofthe Secret Intelligence(SI)
Branch, the Counter-Espionage(X-2)Branch, Research and Analysis, Foreign
Nationalities(FN)Branch, and the Censorship and Documents(CD)Branch. SI and X-2
specialized in espionage and counter-espionage respectively, but they did not have direct
contact with R&A who “produced basic, current, and estimates intelligence dealing
principally with political, military, economic, geographic, and scientific matters.”(1)
This branch analyzed raw information fi-om all sources and turned it into analyzed
intelligence. FN was charged with providing intelligence for propaganda and
psychological warfare, which they gathered overtly on exile and emigre groups. Its
intelligence was also used for secret operations and for guiding foreign and domestic
policy in enemy and occupied countries. The last major component ofDDO and DDI

was

Censorship and Documents who were in charge of“collection, evaluation, and
distribution of documents and related intelligence.” These services were more
specifically used in situations where an intelligence officer went into the field and needed
a cover. Although they initially had help from the British and French intelligence
services, the CD also authenticated over nine hundred agents, people who were willing to
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work as spies for the United States against their own countries of citizenship, in Europe
and North Africa.
OSS had other branches that served as support for the two major branches and the
smaller branches within the DDO and DDL One ofthese branches, Research and
Development(R&D)was in charge ofspy paraphernalia, devices, and special weaponry
used in the covert war. They designed and produced complete lines ofspy weaponry
including, the “spy camera,” which only needed to be pointed at a subject without
focusing; the “Aunt Jemima” explosive, which looked like flour and could be baked into
loaves of bread; and the “firefly*’ explosive, which was fit into the gas tanks of vehicles
where it corroded over a span of anywhere from a halfto ten hours and then explode.(1)
Other branches included funding, field photography, medical services, special relations,
schools and training, civilian personnel, etc.
During 1941 the OSS had fewer responsibilities than it later gained throughout
WWII. One ofthe major aspects ofintelligence during the early 1940s that OSS was not
privy to were the intercepted Axis messages. The major intelligence agency during the
few months before Pearl Harbor could not, therefore, read the intercepted Japanese
communications codenamed MAGIC,and they could only read a limited type of German
messages(ULTRA).(22)Nor could they, because ofliaison and domain issues, obtain
vital information held by the FBI,including the “Tricycle” questionnaire. This
questionnaire was in the possession ofDusko Popov, a Yugoslav bom British double
agent, and it held important questions regarding the defenses ofPearl Harbor as well as
other naval and aerodrome information.(18)The OSS was also confined to operations in
the Eastern Hemisphere. The Western Hemisphere was dominated by the FBI and the
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office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.(24) The major theatres for OSS
during the 1940s were Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and China-Burma-India.(1)After
Pearl Harbor, however, the OSS gained respect as an intelligence agency and their scope
of operations were expanded to include intelligence gathered by the militaiy as well as
the FBI, although liaison between the FBI and Donovan’s intelligence units were never
truly established.
Carrying on with the American tradition ofscaling down “war agencies”, the OSS
was disbanded on September 20, 1945 and completely gone by October 1, only four years
after it was created. The force behind OSS was, at its peak, 13,000 strong, with a total
four year cost of$135 million or approximately $1.1 billion as converted to the modem
economy. Given its size and the talented men and women who worked at OSS,the
capabilities of the intelligence community were easily expanded, and although it

was

disbanded, some services were retained and shuffled around the Departments of State and
the War Department. Donovan’s experiment into the world ofintelligence was a major
turning point in public opinion of a standing intelligence community, even in times of
peace.
We have come to the end of an unusual experiment. This experiment was to
determine whether a group of Americans constituting a cross section ofracial
origins, of abilities, temperaments and talents could meet and risk an encounter
with the long-established and well- trained enemy organizations.... You can go
with the assurance that you have made a beginning in showing the people of
America that only by decisions of national policy based upon accurate
information can we have the chance ofa peace that will endure.(24)
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Although the OSS did not last beyond the war, its legacy has lasted within the
intelligence community and its heir, the CIA.
Prior to the inception of the CIA, a series ofdebates raged through America on
whether or not there was a need for a central intelligence agency. J. Edgar Hoover, the
director of the FBI, vehemently disagreed with Donovan on all fronts, and he sabotaged
Donovan’s chances ofretaining either the OSS or creating a new intelligence super
agency in any way he could. In 1944, FDR commissioned Donovan to write a proposal
“for an intelligence service for the postwar period, which would be in over-all
supervision of all agencies ofthe Gov’t, as to intelligence matters.” This clearly angered
Hoover, who,like many others, did not believe America needed what was sometimes
referred to as a “superduper Gestapo.”(18) At the time ofits proposal, the new central
intelligence agency was completely unknown to the public, but after it was discussed by
the major intelligence and government leaders, someone leaked it to the press. That
person is widely believed to be Hoover in an attempt to prevent its creation. Although
that fact cannot be verified, the leak ultimately postponed any further work on Donovan s
plan, and after FDR’s death on April 1,1945 the plan was virtually blocked. Donovan,
however, would not give up on his dream of a centralized intelligence agency, even
though President Harry Truman was opposed not only to the plan but also to Donovan.
In efforts to deal with the growing Soviet threat. Hoover ultimately realized that
he had to release his tight grip on the intelligence community and allow the creation of a
system which gave policy makers the information they needed from an elite, permanent
intelligence force. Many ideas were tossed about,including Donovan’s earlier plan for a
central intelligence agency, but on January 24,1946, Truman announced the decision to
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create a National Intelligence Authority(NIA)which was to include the Secretary of
State, Secretary of War, Secretary ofthe Navy, and the chiefofstafffor the president
who would control the new Central Intelligence Group(CIG). The CIG housed the
Strategic Services Unit(SSU)which included the X-2 and Strategic Intelligence formerly
of the OSS, and its mission was closely related to Donovan’s initial plan. It lacked some
of the key assets that Donovan proposed, but it was authorized to “collect, coordinate,
and analyze” foreign intelligence for the president. It also lacked the ability to engage in
any policing, subpoena, or internal security functions. (18,24)
CIG was put out of commission by the most important event in United States
intelligence history, the National Security Act of 1947. The Act was a compromise
stemming from the intelligence debate in which the nation was embroiled for two years,
and for the first time in United States history the country had a permanent intelligence
community. Its purpose was to
Promote the national security by providing for a Secretary of Defense; for a
National Military Establishment; for a Department ofthe Army,a Department of
the Navy, and a Department ofthe Air Force; and for the coordination ofthe
activities ofthe National Military Establishment with other d^artments and
agencies ofthe Government concerned with the national security.(13)
The National Security Act of 1947 essentially gave legality to the IC and a permanence
that had been lacking throughout its history. From this point on the IC changed direction,
scope, and structure many times as the result ofcorruption, failure, and international
shock. The era ofintelligence was about to begin, and the struggle between personal
rights and national security heightened dramatically.
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Chapter III: Founding ofthe Intelligence Community
While the major change concerning the U.S. intelligence system took place with
the passage of the National Security Act, there have been countless changes made within
and among the entities that make up the intelligence community after 1947. These
changes stem from the initial problem ofthe IC which is the fact that during its creation,
policy makers failed to provide a method for coordination in order to secure individual
liberties. The lack of a coordinating method caused inherent problems with government
bureaucracy within the IC, and it has been hurt by those problems ever since. Even with
these problems, however, the IC helped put the United States at a greater level ofpower
with more capabilities to monitor the outside world. In order to look at the changes made
within the IC from its inception through modem times, it is necessary to understand
where the permanent IC began and where it is now.
The first permanent members ofthe U.S. intelligence community included the
National Security Council(NSC),the National Military Establishment(NMI),the Joint
Chiefs of Staff(ICS),the Central Intelligence Agency(CIA), and other intelligence
services that were previously in place such as the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI).
The permanent members ofthe National Security Council were the President, Secretary
of State, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Army, Secretary ofNavy, Secretary of Air
Force, and the Chairman ofthe National Security Resources Board. In addition to these
members the President could appoint other secretaries and undersecretaries ofexecutive
departments to come to and advise the meetings ofthe NSC. The Director of Central
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Intelligence (DCI), although not a permanent member ofthe NSC at this time, regularly
attended NSC meetings as well. Over time the members ofthe NSC have continually
changed, but the basic make up of the NSC has always been the President, Secretary of
State, and the Secretary of Defense.(1)
Though the NSC was the body that, along with the President set intelligence
requirements, the Director of Central Intelligence(DCI)was the principle advisor to the
President on intelligence matters. In order to perform his duties, the DCI worked with
the Office ofthe Director of Central Intelligence, which was comprised ofDeputy
Directors and other personnel who would not only supply the DCI with the information
he needed to give the president, but who would also help run the daily aspects ofthe CIA.
(17) Under the National Security Act the CIA’s purpose was
l)To advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence
activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to the national
security;
2)To make recommendations to the National Security Council for the
coordination ofsuch intelligence activities ofthe departments and agencies ofthe
Government as relate to the national security;
3)To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and
provide for the appropriate dissemination ofsuch intelligence within the
Government...;
4)To perform for the benefit ofthe existing intelligence agencies, such additional
services of common concern as the National Security Coxmcil determines can be
more efficiently accomplished centrally;
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5)To perform such other functions and duties as the National Security Council
may from time to time direct.(1)
The CIA was never explicitly given instruction or purpose to engage in covert actions,
but the National Security Act gave direct authority over the CIA to the President who,
with approval of the NSC,could have the CIA perform cover operations. The provision
for this authority was given under the fifth purpose ofthe CIA because ofits ambiguity
and ease of interpretation, and throughout the years different presidential administrations
and IC leaders took great liberties with the clause, which often led to serious
infringements of the law and personal rights under the law.
Only two years later, the first of many IC reforms took place, the Act’s 1949
amendments streamlined the National Military Establishment by demoting the Secretaries
of Army, Navy, and Air Force from cabinet level positions because their respective
departments were downgraded from executive to militaiy level status. The NMI became
the Department of Defense(DOD)with executive level status; therefore, the Secretary of
Defense became a cabinet level position. The purpose ofthese amendments was,

as

designated by the 1949 Act, not to “merge” the forces, but to “provide for their
authoritative coordination and unified direction...”(13) The composition ofthe NSC
changed as well. The Secretaries ofthe different military branches were no longer
members, but the President could appoint them to the coimcil from time to time as he saw
fit and “with the advice and consent ofthe Senate.”(13) The other changes in
composition ofthe NSC were the addition ofthe Secretary ofDefense and the Vice
President.
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Outside the immediate scope ofthe 1949 amendments to the National Security
Act was another important change in the IC. Under Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 2010,
the predecessor to the National Security Agency,the Armed Forces Security Agency
(AFSA) was formed. The AFSA was a part ofthe DOD under the direct control ofthe
JCS, and it was supposed to “direct the communications intelligence and electronic
intelligence activities of the military service signals intelligence.”(17)
The latter part of the 1940s and the early 1950s brought an imexpected turn of
events in South Asia which was catalyzed by the invasion of South Korea in 1950.
Although the IC as a permanent entity was still in its formative years, its failure to predict
the invasion once again prompted reform. These reforms included an increased emphasis
on national intelligence estimates(NIEs), which are projections ofcurrent “military,
political, and economic trends into the future...” as well as the means by which likely
implications regarding the trends are disseminated to policy makers, and a broadened
scope of responsibility due to the newly global Cold War.(12,17) The emergence ofthe
Cold War into the global sphere did not merely have an affect on the emphasis of U.S.
intelligence, but it also had an affect on the agencies and stmcture ofthe IC. As a result
of unsuccessful control of communications intelligence, the AFSA was dismantled and its
personnel were dispersed within the National Security Agency, which was formally
created on October 24, 1952 by an NSC directive.(17)
The CIA’s structure and purpose also changed during the 1950s as a result ofthe
Korean War and two important coups in 1953 and 1954. The first ofthese coups
changed the way policy makers and intelligence leaders viewed covert operations. The
1953 coup in Iran was instigated by a series of demonstrations led, secretly, by the U.S.,
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which overthrew Premier Mohammad Mossadegh and placed the shah in power. Prior to
this coup, covert operations were not often used because they were dangerous to those
performing the operations. They were also dangerous because oftheir ability to destroy
diplomacy among nations ifthey failed. Its great success, however, shed new light on the
relevance and value of covert operations, and the CIA began to fully embrace its purpose
as directed by the President. The Guatemala Coup of 1954, when the U.S. successfully
helped rebels overthrow Jacobo Arbenz Guzman through clandestine means, gave
steadfastness to covert operations because ofits proofthat they worked and that the
Iranian coup was not a fluke.(12) According to General James H. Doolittle, the head of
a secret NSC “Special Study Group on Covert Activities,” the U.S. had to get into the
field of covert action.
If the United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of“fair play*
must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counter
espionage services and must learn to subvert sabotage and destroy our enemies by
more clever, more sophisticated, and more effective methods than those used
against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made
acquainted with, understand and support this fundamentally repugnant
philosophy.(1)
Simultaneous covert operations were conducted as these coups were taking place that
were not as successfiil, and therefore worked against Doolittle’s assertions. These
operations included secret warfare in Tibet and Laos, air support in Thailand, and a
serious, but not widely publicized failure ofintervention in Indonesia. Although the
coups were an important breakthrough for cover operations, the other failures emphasized
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constitutional issues surrounding foreign policy and international treaties that were
steeped in the moral and ethical questions Americans continually asked ofintelligence.
(1) During this time Americans were becoming increasingly agitated with the state of
intelligence and with the government over the illegal activities and infringements on
personal rights that were such a huge part ofthe 1950s, Americans were not learning to
understand the “repugnant philosophy” ofcovert operations.
The greatest turmoil surrounding the IC occurred from around 1960 to the 1976
reorganization. During this era major international blunders highlighted the failures of
intelligence as well as its relation to policy makers. The Bay ofPigs operation is
considered one of the darkest days for covert action and intelligence performance. After
Fidel Castro took power in Cuba in early 1959,the U.S. government began to recognize
the dangers he presented to the stability of Latin America. A short year later it began
preparations for overthrowing Castro by secretly instigating and supporting another
Cuban revolution. There was no public discussion ofthe affair, and all preparations were
conducted secretly, actions that were completely unjustifiable within the confines ofthe
law. The event ended in disaster, and it put a huge black mark on the IC, especially the
CIA, which was the most involved. The success ofthe Cuban Missile Crisis, on the other
hand, helped the position ofthe IC because it performed exactly as it was intended to
perform by gathering information, analyzing it, and disseminating it to policy makers
without intervening otherwise. In both Cuban operations,though, technology use was
severely lacking, which led to a major emphasis on technological advancement within the
IC, including an upgrade and overhaul ofthe CIA’s Directorate of Science and
Technology. Technology became inseparable with intelligence operations from that
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point on, and only recently have many intelligence operatives and leaders become
disgruntled about the waning human intelligence(HUMINT).
The next major change in the structure ofthe IC occurred in 1961 with the
formation of the Defense Intelligence Agency. From 1959-1961, the United States was
embroiled in the Soviet-U.S. “race for space,” which led to what is known as the “Missile
Gap.” Basically, the IC was accused ofincorrectly inflating the amount of Soviet
missiles in order to maintain the defense budget. In fact, the IC underestimated the
amount of missiles and critics of both the President and the IC were the ones who inflated
the numbers. In any case the IC failed to coordinate information and successfully
estimate the number of Soviet missiles so the United States could be fully prepared for
whatever threat the Soviet Union might pose. President Eisenhower saw this failure to be
a problem with centralization and coordination and proposed a Joint Study Group to
locate and fix the problem that caused the intelligence gap. The Group’s conclusions
found that fragmentation within the DOD was a major problem, and on February 8, 1961
Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara proposed to the NSC that a Defense
Intelligence Agency be established. The DIA was established a few months later as a
function ofthe DOD to coordinate all military intelligence. It was responsible for
l)organization, direction, management, and control over all DOD intelligence
resources assigned to or included within the DIA; 2)review and coordination of
those DOD intelligence functions retained by or assigned to the military
departments... 6)fulfillment ofintelligence requirements of major DOD
components. (17)
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Also in 1961 the National Reconnaissance Office(NRO)joined the IC. It was created as
a joint venture between the Air Force and the CIA. NRO’s responsibilities have always
and continue to include the research, development, and operation ofreconnaissance
systems.(17)
As the 1960s dragged on, so did the problems escalate within the IC. Following
Bay of Pigs, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Missile Gap,the Vietnam War
continued the trend of intelligence failures outweighing its successes. The overriding
effects of the Vietnam War on intelligence include: 1) Americans believed that policy
makers were skewing intelligence to favor their war policies; 2)The Tet offensive,
although not surprising to the government, was a shock to the American public who
viewed it as an intelligence failure; and 3)Intelligence operations, once supported by
Cold War consensus were severely destabilized. Added to the abysmal conditions
surrounding intelligence during the 1960s and 70s was the Watergate scandal in which
the CIA was significantly implicated, although no factual conclusion was ever reached on
its involvement. American sentiment towards the IC and the U.S. government was at its
bleakest since the Civil War. They would sit back no longer and allow corruption and
blatant misuse of power. Political and social movements amassed during this era to the
degree which the U.S. had not seen nor has seen since. Protesters called for justice and
civil rights, and their efforts led to government leaders addressing many ofthe problems
at hand,including the IC. Unfortunately, addressing the problems could not and did not
solve them.
The IC began to take its current shape in 1976 after a series ofinvestigations into
the IC and its reorganizations under the Ford and Carter administrations. Scandals and
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problems within the IC and its connections with top government leaders and policy
makers finally came to a head with the American public who began to demand change.
Basically, they wanted Congressional oversight to end and a better system ofchecks on
intelligence put in place. The influential Senate select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities put together reports based on a series
of investigations and hearings that thoroughly scrutinized the IC. They opened the IC to
the public for the first time in a comprehensive manner that ultimately called for reform
of a community that had at one time been so secretive that the world did not even know it
existed. In the short span of thirty years, the IC became a vast bureaucracy complete with
its own secrets of corruption and intergovernmental work, exactly what Americans hoped
to avoid. The reports showed that Congress “could review sensitive operations without
divulging secrets or playing politics, so on February 18,1976,President Gerald Ford
ordered a Reorganization of Executive Command and Control/ Intelligence Activities.
Control over intelligence took three forms in the Intelligence Oversight Board (lOB),the
Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI), and the Operations Advisory Group(OAG).
(1)The lOB was in charge of controlling illegal activities ofthe IC by receiving reports
firom the CIA’s inspector general and general coimsel and then reporting to the Attorney
General. The CFI was in charge of managing the IC, and the OAG was charged with
examining covert action proposals. In 1978 reorganization took place under the Carter
administration which retained the lOB and set up a newer structure for the IC and its
system of checks. The reforms that took place at the end ofthe 1970s finally confronted
the issues of rights versus security by ensuring better government oversight, especially in
the realm of intelligence. Although a direct attack on the unrestrictive nature of
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intelligence and the shape it took over the years, the reorganizations and added
Congressional restrictions did not completely solve the issue. Presidents and policy
makers could not distort the fifth provision ofthe CIA as easily as they previously could,
but covert operations were still allowed.(1)
Thus, during the mid-1980s, the Reagan administration easily became embroiled
in covert operations by illegally using the proceeds from missile sales to Iran to help fund
the contras in Nicaragua in the Iran-Contra scandal. The gains President Reagan had
made for intelligence since the intelligence failure to predict the 1979 Iranian revolution
at the hands of Ayatollah Khomeini were dashed following Iran-Contra. Americans
again became disillusioned after the Iranian hostage crisis and grew ever more impatient
with the IC. Reagan argued that the 1976 and 1978 reorganizations, although important,
had effectively limited the intelligence community to the point where it was nearly
ineffective. During his presidency more traitors were found than in any other era in U.S.
intelligence history, which helped assuage the people’s outcry after the hostage

crisis. He

also convinced Americans that intelligence was necessary to the country’s security from
international terrorism. After the bombing ofthe U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut,
Americans were far more accepting of Reagan’s opinions regarding intelligence. He
correctly believed, and led many others to believe, that the IC could gather information
on terrorists that would keep the U.S. alert to the threats, but his words were not enough
to outweigh the Iran-Contra affair. Not only did the administration deal with terrorists in
Iran for the release of American prisoners in Lebanon after Reagan said the U.S. would
not deal with terrorists, but also in doing so and in supporting the contras in Nicaragua
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with the money from the arms sales, the administration was clearly breaking the law.
Congressional committees later commented that
The common ingredients of the Iran and Contra policies were secrecy, deception.
and disdain for the law. A small group of senior officials believed that they alone
knew what was right. They viewed knowledge oftheir actions by others in the
Government as a threat to their objectives.(1)
Iran-Contra served a direct blow to the side ofintelligence in the debate over rights and
national security, but even so, the committees also conceded that “Covert operations are a
necessary component of[U.S.] foreign policy.”(1)
Only a couple of years after the problems in Iran, the U.S. intelligence community
was once again caught by surprise, although without detrimental affects to the United
States. Over a three year span that began with the dissolution ofthe Soviet satellite
empire in 1989, the U.S. watched the Soviet Union crumble, but the IC gave no warning
for this major event. Although it was a victory in regards to U.S. containment policy, the
fall of the Soviet empire was a surprise to the IC,thus constituting a failure in the eyes of
Americans. The significant problem most people saw with this failure was the fact that
the Soviet Union was the prime region ofconcern for the intelligence community for over
thirty years. Intelligence efforts revolved around monitoring the Soviet capabilities both
militarily, politically, and geographically as well as subverting to covert operations in
supporting the containment policy. Many people argue that intelligence reports during
the Cold War were inaccurate with regards to Soviet power. The IC can be accused of
concentrating on the “perils and pitfalls ofreform,” but it cannot be accused of not
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knowing the Soviet weaknesses.(12) Simply, weakness did not necessarily mean
collapse.
After the Cold War era, new presidential administrations had trouble defimng
national security interests, the primary factor ofintelligence. Without the defimtion of
national security interests, the intelligence community was essentially at a loss as to what
information was pertinent for policy makers. President George Bush established the idea
of a “new world order,” but it was hard to define. The “new world order” was
characterized by the spread of democracy to the old power blocs who had new common
interests. The idea was far fetched, and it fluctuated in significance and success
throughout the 1990s. Instead of a strong coalition ofsixty states that would put down
aggressors who threatened world peace, Bush got a handful offledgling nations who
were simply struggling for their own security rather than finding concern for the security
of other nations.(11) The United States found itselfbelieving that fiiendship among
states meant automatic trust. Nearly a decade after Bush’s idea played the world stage,
that attitude came to a screeching halt. September 11,2001 presented one ofthe most
significant failures in intelligence history. Bush’s “new world order” was completely
null as the United States could no longer count on allies automatically helping. From that
point on, no matter how long an ally to the United States, other countries had to
demonstrate their friendship with military, political, or diplomatic support.(11)
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Chapter IV: The New World ofIntelligence
The massive failure of U.S. intelligence to predict the terrorist attacks on 9/11
rose from over a decade ofinaction and uncertainty. Islamic terrorist groups have been
forming in America unnoticed since the mid-1980s with the rise ofIslamic
fundamentalism’s virulent hatred of the West. The United States was oblivious to the
fact that large cells of radical Muslims were forming all over the coimtry, even in New
York City where posters in Islamic run convenience stores read “Allah is great—^may
justice come to the infidels.”(16)
In 1983 blasts rocked the U.S. Embassy and Marine Corps barracks in Beirut,
Lebanon. These disasters should have signaled the onslaught ofterror in the coming
years, but once media hype faded, so did the emphasis on the potential problem offuture
terrorism on a massive scale. The Iranian terror group, Hizbollah, was ultimately accused
of the crime, but no investigation into the matters was definite in revealing the
perpetrators. The idea that further investigation into the matter would upset relations
with other Middle Eastern coimtries was more important at the time than finding the
guilty parties. The U.S. continued to remain ignorant ofthe terror threat, and instead
became enthralled with securing people’s rights. In fact, in lieu ofincreasing terror levels
and intelligence gathering on terrorist organizations. Congress passed an amendment to
the Immigration and Nationality Act “so that membership in a terrorist group was no
longer sufficient to deny a visa.” (16) America’s distinct ignorance ofsecurity threats
after the Cold War continued through the 1980s in to the 1990s. For example, in 1991, at
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a time when terrorism was on the rise and civil unrest was prevalent in the Middle East,
the CIA began to shut down many of its operations overseas. Former CIA case officer
Robert Baer says in his memoirs that there was not
a single Muslim agent in all of Germany’s enormous Islamic community,a failing
that would become painfully obvious in the wake ofthe World Trade Center and
Pentagon attacks when trail after trail began to trace back across the ocean to
Hamburg and elsewhere.(4)
Neither President George Bush nor his successor President Bill Clinton set correct
national security initiatives. Their terms were both characterized by wrongly focused
issues of national security that had grave repercussions into the twenty-first century.
National security initiatives are now drastically different, but public sentiment is still
diverse. Many people are calling for racial profiling of Arabs and Muslims at all security
checkpoints where others are spending their energy calling for the rights of suspected
terror prisoners at Guantanamo Bay. Even in a world where turmoil reigns and
America’s security is increasingly threatened by its place in world affairs, U.S. citizens
are no closer to the balance between rights and security that is so desperately needed.
During the 1980s and 1990s intelligence became far more decentralized because
of its greatly expanding bureaucracy. Those shortcomings were highlighted by 9/11 in a
way that no other conflict or disaster the U.S. was involved in ever had. The new
President George W. Bush led the country to reform its intelligence community once
again. Drastic changes were made in efforts to centralize intelligence and create a way
for agencies to work more easily with one another and to form better liaison. One ofthe
major efforts he pushed was the Patriot Act. It is meant to put existing investigative tools
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into the new technological age in order to break down walls that have been detrimental to
liaison among agencies. The Act has renewed America’s interest in the debate over civil
liberties versus personal and national security. Some ofits provisions are extremely
controversial because they extend existing domestic intelligence powers to foreign
intelligence services such as roving wire taps, sneak and peek search warrants, and
delayed notification search warrants.(5) These provisions allow for intelligence agencies
and government law enforcement to track spending, movements,phone usage, and even
library usage of those they suspect of being a risk to national security. Many Americans
are afraid these provisions will lead to a big brother state in which the government spies
on every aspect of the lives of all Americans. They are afraid the government will not
provide for oversight and that limitation on the new programs or provisions will not exist.
Their fears have not been assuaged in the past two years as the current Bush
administration engaged in phone tapping and other intelligence scandals.
A year after the 9/11 attacks. President Bush and Congress established the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, more commonly
known as the 9/11 Commission. The Commission was a bipartisan panel that studied the
events leading up to, during, and after the attacks in order to find out where failures
occurred. They published their findings in 2004 in the widely distributed 9/11
Commission Report, in which they commented not only on the failures, but also on ways
to redesign the IC in order to protect the United States against future acts ofterror. Their
recommendations were generally heeded by policy makers and government leaders
resulting in the most recent redesign ofthe U.S. intelligence community lasting from
2001-2005. The National Security Act of 1947 has again been amended to include a
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Department of Homeland Security, Director of National Intelligence(DNI), National
Counterterrorism Center, National Counter Proliferation Center among other changes.
Another major change within the IC is the distinction ofthe DCI who is now no longer in
charge of the entire IC. When the DNI was created, the DCI became the Director ofthe
Central Intelligence Agency. The amendments also tried to create a more cohesive
intelligence system by providing a means by which the DOD and the CIA could
cooperate operationally and to promote greater sharing among all branches ofthe IC.
(26)
According to the IC’s website, www.intelligence.gov, the current members ofthe
IC are those agencies that cooperate to fulfill executive order 12333, which reads
The United States intelligence effort shall provide the President and the National
Security Council with the necessary information on which to base decisions
concerning the conduct and development offoreign, defense and economic
policy, and the protection of United States national interests from foreign security
threats. All departments and agencies shall cooperate fully to fulfill this goal.
The sixteen departments and agencies included are all the military branches’ intelligence
units, the CIA, DIA, Department ofEnergy, Department of Homeland Security,
Department of State, Department of Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration(DEA),
FBI, National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and the
National Security Agency.(27)
Although the IC has seen drastic change over the course of our nation’s history,
especially in the wake of 9/11, there is still a long way to go before it will be the cohesive
body it desperately needs to be. The move towards centralized intelligence has ebbed
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and flowed with every U.S. conflict and intelligence failure because ofthe ever changing
opinions of Americans on their personal rights and securities. Thanks to the freedoms of
American democracy this struggle will continue to thrive and spawn debate for centuries
to come, but it will remain important for America to look beyond its own borders and the
lives of its own people to the greater picture that the people living in nations outside of
those borders provide. That greater picture, like a surrealist painting, is not often
logically comprehensible, and unless the U.S. and its intelligence system begin to cohere
in spite of the rights versus security debate and not by adding layers ofbureaucracy, we
will never be secure from international threats.
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the aftermath of the Cold War with no desire to grasp the lines ofinformation thrown
during the 1990s, and now it is time to step up and truly defend America,
The series of changes to the intelligence community after 9/11 were all centered
on unification. Four out of the five major recommendations ofthe 9/11 Commission
began with the word ‘^mifying,” and they asked that it be used not only forjoint
intelligence but also for joint action.(28)The combination ofjoint intelligence and joint
action would finally open the door for an “all source” system ofintelligence in the United
States. Basically, the hope for future intelligence is that all forms ofintelligence;
HUMINT,SIGINT,imagery intelligence(IMINT),space surveillance, and open sources;
be integrated into a single compilation ofinformation given to policy makers. The
outlook, however, is not as good as hoped for. We still see problems with intelligence
that lead America down dangerous paths with no light to guide it.
The most current example ofintelligence failure happened in 2003 when the
United State entered the Iraq War. The basis for going to war with Iraq was the
controversial belief that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction(WMD)that
he might possibly give to terrorists he was alleged to be harboring. Unfortunately the IC
ran no operatives in Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s reign, an almost identical problem
with the failure to plant operatives within Osama bin Laden’s terrorist traimng camps that
were distinctly open in their recmiting. The lack of human operatives was a grave
mistake for the IC, and it resulted in completely obsolete information regarding WMDs in
Iraq. Needless to say, America has been in an uproar since the invasion of Iraq and the
fall of Saddam’s regime produced no signs of WMDs. As a result ofbad intelligence

-61-

skewed by policy makers, the U.S. is embroiled in a war that it almost certainly cannot
win; a war of ideas in which there is no clear enemy.
After Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of2004,the questions
surrounding the IC are shifting. Instead of wondering what the next change will be
Americans are wondering if the changes are ever going to start working or ifthey are
simply layers added to an already oversized, underachieving bureaucracy. Enough time
has not passed in order to answer that question, but speculation suggests that the IC does
not need just another person trying to centralize intelligence, which obviously does not
work since the CIA was originally envisioned to do just that. The 9/11 Commission’s
recommendations, while admirable, are not rational for long term improvement ofthe
intelligence community. They are more idealistic than sensible for U.S. intelligence, and
within only three years some ofthem have become obsolete. The Patriot Act was passed
before the 9/11 Commission Report was even published, and its provisions gave the IC a
better handle on inter-agency sharing by breaking down many ofthe barriers that resulted
from the issue of rights versus security. Breaking down these barriers is necessary, even
if it seems to be an infringement on the rights ofsome people. If U.S. intelligence could
cohere, problems with rights would be better balanced. What is important is the political
oversight and management that follow the Act and its provisions, which generally focus
on gathering and sharing information and do not have any bearing on policing actions.
(30)
The greatest challenge for the future security of the United States is not
necessarily in finding the right formula for structuring the intelligence community. It is
in finding the right formula for balancing security and civil liberties. Where it is un-
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American to take freedom away from people rather than give and spread it as much as
possible, it is also un-American to allow our nation to be vulnerable. Debate will always
follow disastrous events on whether or not they could have been prevented or handled
better by our intelligence systeem, and following the debate will be a series ofchanges
meant to ‘‘unify” or “strengthen” the system. History shows this trend to be true, and it
also shows that it has not been effective. Petronius Arbiter, a

century Roman satirist.

says
We tend to meet any new situation in life by reorganizing, and what a wonderful
method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion,
inefficiency and demoralization.(30)
The more layers we add to our intelligence system the more likely it will be to become
entrenched in the muck and mire of bureaucracy that continually slows down government
processes. In order to meet the rigorous standards ofthe heightening security threats to
our nation in the age of terrorism, we must accede some of our personal privacies and
rights to the cause of our security and the security of our fellow countrymen.
Our nation is faced with a not-so-clear, but very present danger that seeks to destroy the
heart of America. The more we sectionalize and decentralize our personal views on
“freedom” in the United States, the easier it will be for our enemies to infiltrate and
annihilate all of our freedoms. Just as our government was founded based on a series of
compromises, the state of our intelligence system must also be characterized by much
greater levels ofthat same American spirit ofcooperation.
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